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Germain Grisez, miss the point (p. lO2 and following). Bowlin finds 
fault also with Ralph McInerny's view that evaluating the morality of an 
action is largely a matter of determining its place in a hierarchy of natu-
ral inclinations (p. lOS). Probably inspired by his fixation on contin-
gency, Bowlin assumes that Aquinas does not claim that the first pre-
cepts provide moral guidance (p. 115). The reader wonders what 
Bowlin makes ofthe assertion "all those things to which man has a natu-
ral inclination are naturally apprehended as good and therefore as ob-
jects of pursuit" (Summa Theologice, I-II, 94, 2). It is of course true that 
the individual virtuous acts do no fall under the natural law, although 
they are its prolongation. As every student of Aquinas knows, the appli-
cation of the principles depends also on the circumstances (Summa 
Theologice, I-II, 94, :3). 
Bowlin argues against McInerny-wrongly to my understanding-that 
the natural law precepts must not be seen as a specification of the hu-
man good that the virtuous person must pursue (p. 129). More astonish-
ing even is his statement: "The first precepts of the natural law leave us 
very nearly morally destitute" (p. 133). Bowlin does not sufficiently 
consider the acts that lead to a virtuous deed as an almost organic unity. 
In chapter 4 we read that virtues are excellent, not simply but rela-
tively (p. 139; compare p. 145), because one cannot separate them from 
the conditions which make human life so difficult. However, Thomas 
says little about fortune's meaning for the virtuous life (p. 167). Accord-
ing to Bowlin succE'ssful acts of virtue depend on luck. The reader won-
ders what "successful" means. Any act of virtue has its own truth, good-
ness, and beauty. Bowlin does not like Aquinas's saying that Providence 
will provide us with the amount of external goods we need for a virtu-
ous life (p. 17S). Indeed, if one considers the primacy of the spiritual, 
the quantity of external goods might be minimal for some people. 
Aquinas gives no reason to think that the happiness of the virtuous is 
largely a consequence of good fortune (p. 199). At the end of his learned 
expose Bowlin comes around to the conclusions every Thomist is famil-
iar with: fortune, lucky family circumstances, and so on, matter less for 
happiness than acting virtuously (p. 203). He nevertheless sees a con-
flict between two views: Thomas's confidence that virtues can succeed 
against fortune and his discontent, perhaps despair, because oftheir fra-
gility (p. 215). 
Bowlin's book is an important and learned study. The author shows a 
great deal of familiarity with the Prima Secundce of the Summa 
Theologice, and raises intelligent questions. However, it is doubtful 
whether the approach via the role of fortune does justice to what for Th-
omas is the outstanding value of the virtues as such and the interior acts 
they allow us to perform in the first place.-Leo J. Elders, Institute of 
Philosophy "Rolduc," Kerkrade, The Netherlands. 
BROWN, Hunter. William James on Radical Empiricism and Religion. Tor-
onto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. 192 pp. Cloth, $40.00-In this 
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lucid and tightly crafted book, Brown battles fideistic and subjectivist 
interpretations of James's pragmatism by cogently arguing that his ro-
bust empiricism's careful attention to all features of experience imposes 
a number of constraints on belief formation, constraints metaphysical, 
noetic, evidential, factual, discursive, and theological. Brown persua-
sively argues that the issue that concerns James, particularly in his will 
to believe doctrine, is what would constitute intellectually responsible 
behavior toward certain existing beliefs, including religious ones that, 
while inconclusive evidentially, conform to those constraints. Brown 
thinks that the reasons have not been sufficiently understood why 
James's belief in the difficulty of disentangling a proposition's probabil-
ity from its desirability does not force James into an endorsement of 
wishful thinking, so Brown carefully elucidates James's three distin-
guishing characteristics of live options to rectify this deficiency. First, 
live ness involves a strong inclination to believe a proposition. There is 
distinct imbalance between religious options and alternatives: live the-
ism involves a tenacious passional need, engages one's sympathetic na-
ture in ways not to be found in a purely abstract analysis of theism, and 
generates an invigorating disposition and intellectual openness. Sec-
ond, live belief builds on an intellectual plausibility for the subject. 
Third, live belief arises from a complex interdependence of many influ-
ences, the neglect of which in the development of norms for responsible 
intellectual conduct risks creating only a facade of doxastic responsibil-
ity behind which subjectivity may continue to exercise a powerful and 
unregulated influence. Among what is constitutive of the delicate idio-
syncrasy and labyrinthine character of the intellectual life is included an 
incalculable number of intertwining historical, cultural, linguistic, tem-
peramental, neurological, and volitional influences, which renders irre-
deemably simplistic those appeals to evidence per se or the deliver-
ances of a dispassionately judicial intellect. (Further explorations of 
distinctly aesthetic aspects of Jamesean rationality may have proven 
useful here as well). Brown insists that in James's account subjective 
influences do not enjoy the degree of autonomy imputed to them by crit-
ics who saddle him with the charge of wishful thinking. James depicts 
subjective states as framed and limited in their influence by their inter-
relations within the unity of the many elements that together constitute 
immediate experience, and also by their interrelations with the many 
different kinds of consequences which flow from particular beliefs. 
Brown attacks the long-standing propensity among commentators to ig-
nore this complex unity of immediate experience, and neglect therefore 
the degree to which subjective influences are integrally involved in an 
immediate, multidimensional concrete relationship with the world 
which issues in results and consequences that cannot be responsibly ig-
nored. The prudential complaint that James gives primacy to personally 
desirable consequences in defending theistic belief, and the criticism 
that James confuses belief with hypothesis-adoption, share the failure to 
grapple with what consequences were in fact held by James to flow 
from live theism. The major consequence of theistic belief was the 
strenuous mood, which suffuses the moral life with the note of infini-
tude and mystery. Living in the strenuous mood is to reject self-interest, 
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to identify with the disenfranchised, to elevate the fervor with which the 
pursuit of moral discernment is undertaken, and to heighten participa-
tion in the historical dialectic of theory and demand. The often trying, 
counter-cultural, and costly features of the strenuous mood bear little 
resemblance to easy conformism and personal advantage. James, 
Brown further argues, was clearly aware that he had chosen to defend 
the belief state rather than mere hypothesis-adoption; for a wager argu-
ment, as even Paseal saw, cannot generate live theism, and because the 
strenuous mood is uniquely a function of belief. (Here Brown perhaps 
neglects the way Pascal saw how we can exercise indirect volitional 
control over belief, though his treatment of Pascal is perceptive). If it 
should tum out that it is only by according epistemological significance 
to distinctive experiential states that a particular commensurateness be-
tween persons and world can be discovered, then the a priori discount-
ing of those states would permanently preclude finding such truth. As 
Brown makes clear, James found entirely dubious the cultural propen-
sity to beg such questions by automatically privileging conventional can-
ons of evidentially responsible behavior without due regard for the chal-
lenge posed to those very canons by such a recalcitrant phenomenon as 
live theism. 
Brown's careful analysis of live theism, immediate experience, and 
the strenuous mood in James's philosophy provides a vitally needed cor-
rective to a number of tired, misguided criticisms of James, and his sug-
gestion to locate James more solidly within debates among certain con-
temporary philosophers-like reformed epistemologists-may well 
prove most perspicacious. I would highly recommend this book for any-
one who wants a more accurate understanding and deeper appreciation 
of James generally or of his religious epistemology in particular.-David 
Baggett, Detriot, Michigan. 
CLAYTON, Philip. The Problem of God in Modern Thought. Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000. xv + 516 pp. Cloth, 
$40.00-Philip Clayton's newest book investigates the historical ante-
cedents of panentheism. Clayton's aim, however, is more than a histori-
cal investigation into the problem of God from Descartes to Schelling. 
"This book is published not Gust) with the goal of winning support for 
one particular set of conclusions, but equally with the hope of bringing 
various groups of experts back into dialogue with one another" (p. xiii). 
The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 opens against the present 
backdrop of pluralism and skepticism (p. 6). Though Clayton accepts 
that Putnam, ROlty, Bennett, Derrida, and other current students of 
Kant have effectively laid to rest the "time-transcendent philosophies" 
(p. 8) of the past, he is not prepared to accede to extreme pluralism and 
its attendant relativism. Rather, he opts for "soft" pluralism, which 
avoids both "full metaphoricity and the univocity of a single established 
theory" (p. 16) and argues that the very multiplicity of models of God 
constitutes a drive toward the unity of conceptual expression. "Models 
